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The author is Assistant Professor of History in the University of Houston, Texas. He
was formerly Instructor in the Milwaukee Extension Division of the University of Wis-
consin. His interest in the Grand Jury began when he was a student in law in the Uni-
versity. What intrigued him particularly was the question why about one half of our
states have abandoned it. The article following is an abbreviation of Dr. Younger's
doctor's thesis entitled A History of the Grand Jury in the United States which he pre-
sented to the University of Wisconsin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Part three under this title, the final portion of Professor Younger's contribution,
will be published in our next number.-EDITOR a.
As Justice James Wilson took his place at the front of the hall of the Philadelphia
Academy, he was clearly pleased to see that so many cabinet officers, members of
Congress, and leaders of Philadelphia society had braved the winter weather to
attend his weekly law lecture. This was the Justice's second winter of lecturing as
Professor of Law in the newly established College of Philadelphia. His course had
been a tremendous social success. The first series opened auspiciously December 15,
1790 before a distinguished audience which included President and Mrs. Washington.
Among his fellow lawyers, however, Wilson's discourses had been received with
reserved acclaim. Many resented his severe criticism of Blackstone, while others
felt disturbed by his ultra-Federalist views.
Justice Wilson's topic for discussion this evening was the jury, and he began with
an analysis of the role of the grand jury in American law. He rejected summarily the
views of those persons who would restrict the grand jury to the consideration of
matters laid before them by the public prosecutor or given them in charge by the
court. He stated that such a concept presented "a very imperfect view of the duty
required of grand jurors." Their oath assigned no limit to their area of inquiry save
their own diligence. Wilson stated that he saw in the grand jury more than a body
set up merely to seek out law violators. He viewed it as an important instrument of
democratic government, "a great channel of communication between those who make
and administer the laws and those for whom the laws are made and administered."
Elaborating upon his statement, the Justice pointed out that all the operations of
government and all its officers came within the view of grand juries, giving them an
unrivaled ability to suggest public improvements and expose corruption in govern-
ment.'
Justice Wilson was not the first American jurist to express such views regarding
the grand jury. Almost ten years earlier Judge Francis Hopkinson of Philadelphia
'BIRD WILSON (ed.), THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (Philadelphia, 1804), II, 365-367; CHARLES
WARREN, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (Boston, 1911), 347; THE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY (20 vols., New York, 1928-1936), XX, 330.
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had denounced judicial encroachment upon juries. He too stated that from the terms
of their oath, there was "no bound or limit set to any number or sort of persons of
whom they are bound to inquire." However, Hopkinson denied that judges could
impose directions upor grand jurors.2 Early in 1793 Secretary of the Treasury
Alexander Hamilton had instructed customs officials to report to him all infractions
of the neutrality laws. Thomas Jefferson protested vigorously against this unwar-
ranted invasion of the province of grand juries. He objected to giving government
officials authority to act as criminal informers and pointed out that the advantage of
inquests was that "a grand juror cannot carry on a systematic persecution against
a neighbor whom he hates because he is not permanent in the office." 3 If the grand
jury were to serve as an instrument of the people it was necessary that any private
citizen have the right to go before a grand inquest. In 1794 Attorney General of the
United States William Bradford announced that it was not necessary for persons to
approach a grand jury through a committing magistrate.4
In spite of these pronouncement, however, not all jurists were certain that inde-
pendent grand juries were a good thing. Judge Alexander Addison of Pennsylvania
feared that danger lay in giving jurors too free a hand in their investigations. In a
charge delivered in 1792 he went on record as favoring restrictions upon grand juries.
Judge Addison cautioned the jurors that they could act only when a matter came
within the actual knowledge of one of them, or when the judge or district attorney
submitted an indictment for their consideration. They could investigate matters of
public importance only if the judge charged them to do so. Such a restricted view of
jury powers prohibited them from summoning witnesses on their own initiative and
indicting persons on the basis of testimony received. It had the effect of placing
these juries almost entirely under the control of the court.5
Restrictions imposed by courts were not the only means by which the juries were
deprived of their powers of investigation. In Connecticut, through long practice,
it had almost ceased to exist as an investigating body. Each town in the state still
elected two persons each year to serve as jurors, but they no longer met as a body
unless summoned by a court. Indictment by a full jury was mandatory only in case
of crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. In all other cases it became the
practice for individual jurors or the district attorney to sign a complaint when they
received information of a crime. Grand jurors in Connecticut tended to become
informing officers with an annual term of office, possessed of the authority to make
complaints individually, a power which they did not have at common law. As a
result of such a system, they met infrequently as a body and through disuse lost most
of their broad powers of initiating investigations. 6
2 THE MISCELLxANEOUS ESSAYS AND OCCASIONAL WRITINGS OF FRANcIs HOPKN SON (Philadelphia,
1792), I, 207-208.
3Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, May 8, 1793, PAUL L. FORD (ed.), THE
WoRKs or THOmAS JEFFERSON (New York, 1904), VII, 316-318.
4 Letter from Attorney General Bradford to the Secretary of State, February 20, 1794, OFINIoNS
or THE ATTiORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 1, 22.
5 ALEXANDER ADDISON, REPORTS OF CASES IN THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE F=T CIRCUIT
(Washington, 1800), Part I, 37-46.
6 STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT (1784), 94, (1808), 371-372; DWIGHT Looms and J. GILBERT




The grand jury also became the target of those who denounced the institution in
the name of reform. In England, Jeremy Bentham, the great codifier and legal
reformer, struck out at the grand inquest as "an engine of corruption" which was
"systematically packed" on behalf of the upper classes. He charged that juries in
Britain had become assemblies composed almost exclusively of gentlemen, "to the
exclusion of the Yeomen." In addition to its misuse, Bentham opposed it on grounds
of efficiency. As a utilitarian, he had little patience with a body composed of "a
miscellaneous company of men" untrained in the law. He believed that a profes-
sionally trained prosecutor could perform the functions of a grand jury with far
greater efficiency and with less expense to the people and less bother to the courts.7
Bentham's reform proposals received wide circulation in the United States and led
American legal scholars to reassess the value of the grand jury. Some came to the
conclusion that public indifference and apathy seriously impaired its usefulness.
They blamed juries themselves for criticism because they frequently neglected to
conduct investigations into the conditions of prisons, roads, bridges and nuisances
within the community.8 Edward Livingston, prominent Jeffersonian, became a
disciple of Bentham in the United States and an ardent advocate of codification.
In 1821 the state of Louisiana commissioned him to revise and codify its criminal
laws. The procedural provisions of the completed Livingston Code confined grand
juries to passing upon indictments submitted to them. They could only determine
whether persons had violated penal laws of the state, but would have no power to
initiate presentments or express their opinions on other matters. Livingston would
limit judges to a mere statement of the law when addressing the jury, ruling out all
remarks of a political nature. 9 These restrictions incorporated in the proposed
Louisiana Code met the whole-hearted approval of Chancellor James Kent of New
York, in spite of the fact that he disapproved of codification. The New York jurist
and law professor congratulated Livingston on the section of his code which severely
limited grand jury activity, stating, "I am exceedingly pleased with the provision
confining grand juries to the business of the penal law and not admitting any ex-
pression of opinion on other subjects."' 0
While a few American legal scholars were hoping to curb the inquisitorial powers
of the jury, a western court spoke out forcefully in favor of very broad powers for
grand inquests. In 1829 a grand jury in St. Louis, Missouri embarked upon an in-
vestigation of gambling in the community. They summoned a great many witnesses,
questioned them on a wide variety of subjects, and indicted various persons on the
basis of this testimony. Several of those indicated asked the court to quash the
7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES
(London, 1821), 14-28; JOHN BOWRING (ed.), THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (Edinburgh, 1843),
II, 139-140, 171.
8 Cottu On English Law, NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW (October, 1821), XIII, 347.
9 THE COm LETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JUIUSPRUDENCE (New York,
1873), I, 372, II, 249-250.
10 Letter from James Kent to Edward Livingston, February 17, 1826, Two Letters of Chancellor
Kent, AMERICAN LAW REvIEw (April 1878), XII, 485; JOHN T. HORTON, JAMES KENT, A STUDY IN
CONSERVATISM (New York, 1939), 171.
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indictments on the grounds that the jurors had exceeded their authority by engaging
in a "fishing expedition" with no particular offense in mind. The Supreme Court of
Missouri, however, upheld the jurors and declared that to hold otherwise "would
strip them of their greatest utility and convert them into a mere engine to be acted
upon by circuit attorneys or those who might choose to use them."'" Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts echoed the sentiments of the Missouri court con-
cerning the need for independent grand jury action. He told members of a Massa-
chusetts inquest that they alone, because of the method of their selection and the
temporary nature of their authority, were "beyond the reach of fear or favor, or of
being overawed by power or seduced by persuasion."'' Justice Joseph Story of the
United States Supreme Court took a different position, however. In an article
written in 1831 for Francis Lieber's Encyclopaedia Americana, he described a grand
jury as acting only "at the instigation of the government." Story made no mention
of jurors acting independently of the court or initiating investigations on their own."
In England, criticism of the jury begun by Bentham continued to attract support
and gradually bore fruit in the form of proposals to abolish the system entirely.
Robert Peel was one of the first to suggest that a responsible public prosecutor should
be appointed in its place. 4 Suggestions that Parliament do away with the institution
in England led both defenders and attackers to present their cases to the public.
A citizen writing to the London Times under the name, "an admirer of grand juries,"
praised them as protectors of liberty and warned that it would take a bold man to
bring a bill into Parliament to abolish them. An answering letter, signed "a Middlesex
Magistrate" advocated a Parliamentary inquiry into the exorbitant expenses of
grand juries. The writer expressed satisfaction that the proposals for abolition were
gaining ground. 5 In 1834 and again in 1836 Parliamentary resolutions to curtail
their use aroused interest in English legal circles, but they were not successful.'
6
Agitation for abolition of the grand jury in the United States did not gain ground
as rapidly as in England, but in at least one state prosecution on an information
rather than on an indictment received encouragement. In Vermont, the state con-
stitution did not specifically guarantee the right to indictment by a grand jury in
all criminal cases. As a result, many lesser crimes came to trial at the instance of the
public prosecutor. In 1836 the defendant in a criminal trial challenged this procedure
and claimed that the state had violated the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution by prosecuting him on an information. The Supreme Court of Vermont
held that the restrictions imposed by the fifth amendment applied only to the federal
government and not to the states, and that the states were free to abolish the juries
entirely insofar as the federal constitution was concerned.' 7
11 Ward vs the State, 2 Missouri 120 (1829).
12 Chief Justice Shaw's Charge to the Grand Jury, THE AMERICAN JURIST (July 1832), VIII, 216.
13 FRANCIS LIEBER (ed.), ENCYCLOPAEDiA AMERICANNA (Philadelphia, 1831), VIII, 284; FRANK
FRIEDEL, Francis Lieber, NINETEENTH-CENTURY IDEALIST (Baton Rouge, 1947), 69.
11 Grand Juries, JUIsT (London) (June 1827), I, 190-202; PETER LAUIE, THE UsE AND ABUSE
oa' GRAND JThms (London, 1832), 5.
Is Letters to the Editor, London TIMES, December 23, 30,31, 1833; September 2, 1834.
16-Proposed Abolition of the Grand Jury, TE LEGAL OBSERVER (London), (December 13, 1834),
IX, 129; (April 30, 1836), XI, 492.
1 FRANCIS N. THORPE (ed.), TE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Washington, 1909),
VI, 3740; State vs Keyes, 8 Vermont 57 (1836).
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RESTRICTING GRAND JURY POWERS
In 1837 the grand jury of Sullivan County, Tennessee initiated a sweeping in-
vestigation into illegal gambling in their community and in the course of the probe
summoned a large number of persons to testify. A state law empowered the jurors
to summon witnesses to investigate "illegal gaming." Among the indictments re-
turned by the grand jury, based upon testimony of witnesses, was one for betting
on an election. The Supreme Court of Tennessee quashed the indictment and warned
future juries that they did not possess "general inquisitorial powers" and could
call witnesses only where specifically authorized by law. The Court held that betting
on elections could not be construed as "illegal gaming."' 8 Several years later, jurors
of Maury County, Tennessee indicted a master for permitting his slave to sell
liquor. The inquest learned of the incident from a witness they had summoned to
testify on another matter. Again the Tennessee Supreme Court restricted the power
of the jury to act independently and held that indictments had to be based upon the
actual knowledge of one of the panel members. 9
In Cincinnati the newly appointed federal judge, Timothy Walker, expressed the
same restricted view. In 1842 he told a jury, "Your sole function is to pass upon
indictments. The term presentment confers no separate authority.... Yet in some
states advantage has been taken of a similar expression to convert a grand jury into
a body of political supervisors." Walker was not a newcomer to western legal circles.
He studied under Joseph Story at Harvard and went to Cincinnati in 1830. There he
organized a law school, founded the Western Law Journal and became an ardent
advocate o f legal reform.' 0
Two years after Timothy Walker read his restrictive charge in Cincinnati, the
question of powers came up ii Pennsylvania. In May, 1844 the convention of the
Native American Association in Philadelphia ended in a series of destructive riots
when Irish groups attempted to break up their meeting. The Governor called out the
state militia after mobs had burned several buildings. At this point, Charles J. Jack,
a member of the Native American group, addressed a letter to the grand jury then in
session, protesting that the call for troops was an attempt to crush the Native
Americans by military force. When he learned of the letter, Judge Anson V. Parsons
of the Philadelphia Court of Quarter Sessions cited Jack for contempt and declared
that it was an "indictable offense" for a private individual to communicate with a
grand jury. Furthermore, Parsons announced that jurors were officers of the court
under its legal direction and that only the court could convey information and
instructions to them.2'
The following year a Philadelphia grand jury informed the court that one of its
members had charged Richard L. Lloyd and Benjamin E. Carpenter, members of
the city Board of Health, with stealing public funds. The jurors asked the court to
call witnesses and order the Board of Health to produce its books. Judge Edward
Is State vs Smith, 19 Tennessee 99 (1838).
19 State vs Love, 23 Tennessee 255 (1843).
20 Charge Delivered by T. Walker, WESTERN LAW JOURNAL (May 1844), I, 337-338; Obituary of
Timothy Walker, THE LAW REPORTER (April, 1856), XVIII, 708.
21 Commonwealth ex rel Jack vs Crans, 3 PENxA LAW JouRmAL 443 (1844).
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King refused the request, stating that grand jurors could not proceed to investigate
a matter unless the judge gave it to them in charge or the district attorney brought
it to their attention. He told the jurors that they were free to initiate presentments
only where all of the facts of the offense were known to one of their number. The
policy announced by Pennsylvania courts, of severely limiting inquisitorial activities,
was entirely foreign to the traditional concept of jury powers. Under the common
law, juries had the authority to inquire into all violations of the law in their county
and to summon before them all persons who could give them information.2
Sentiment in favor of limiting the juries gained favor. In 1846 Congress made the
summoning of federal grand juries discretionary with the presiding judge. Previously
such a jury had attended every session of the federal district and circuit courts.
Under the new law the federal marshal would not summon a panel unless the judge
ordered him to do so.n
Judicial rulings restricting the independence of grand juries found ready acceptance
among several American legal scholars. Francis Wharton, recognized authority in the
field of criminal law, noted with approval the decisions of the Tennessee and Pennsyl-
vania courts making grand inquests mere adjuncts of the court. Wharton stated
that the value of grand juries depended upon the political tendencies of the age. While
they may have been important at one time as a barrier to "frivolous prosecutions"
by the state, in the United States they were more useful as restraints upon "the
violence of popular excitement and the malice of private prosecutors." If they were
necessary at all, Wharton thought it was to serve as a means of protecting established
institutions from the actions of the people. He did not see in the grand jury a means
of increasing popular participation in government such as James Wilson had en-
visioned. 4
Edward Ingersoll, prominent reforming member of the Pennsylvania Bar, pub-
lished an essay on grand juries in 1849 in which he condemned the institution as
incompatible with the American constitutional guarantee of freedom. Ingersoll
approved limitations placed upon their investigating activities because he believed
that their secrecy and power to indict upon the knowledge of their own members,
without additional evidence or witnesses, was "at variance with all modern English
theory of judicial proceeding." He declared that inquests, if retained at all, should
be limited to passing upon cases where the defendant had already had a preliminary
hearing before a committing magistrate.25
The same year in which Edward Ingersoll denounced the grand jury system as
2 In the matter of the Communication of the grand jury in the case of Lloyd and Carpenter, 5 PENNA
LAW JOURNAL 55 (1845); GEORGE H. DESSION AND ISADORE H. COHEN, The Inquisitorial Functions
of Grand Juries, YALE LAW JOURNAL (March 1932), 695.
2 STATUTES AT LARGE or THE UNITED STATES (1846), IX, 72; JOmNAL OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE (1845-1846), 495-496; JOURNAL OF TH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1845-1846) 1241-
1242.
2 4 
FRANCIs WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIIIINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia
1857), 227-234.
25 EDWARD INGERSOLL, THE HISTORY AND LAW OF THE WIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH AN ESSAY




dangerous to freedom, the Code Commissioners of New York presented to the
legislature of that state their draft of a proposed code of criminal procedure. Headed
by David Dudley Field, long a proponent of legal reform and codification, the
Commissioners left no doubt as to their position on the question of the grand jury.
They referred to jury service as a burdensome duty and stated flatly that they would
have recommended complete abolition of the institution in New York, had it not
been for guarantees contained in the state constitution. The Commissioners did the
next best thing, however, and advised the legislators that "limits must be placed to
the extent of its powers and restraint must be placed upon their exercise." The New
York legislature did not adopt the proposed criminal code, nor did it heed the advice
of the commissioners to curtail their power. 6
EFFORTS TO ABOLISH THE GRAND JURY
While sentiment in favor of restricting the grand jury gained strength in American
legal circles, in England a strong movement developed to abolish the institution
entirely. By the mid-nineteenth century a large number of Englishmen shared
Jeremy Bentham's views. In February, 1848 the Mayor and Aldermen of South-
ampton petitioned the House of Commons to do away with all grand juries. Later
in the same year, jurors attending the Central Criminal Court in London recom-
mended abolition of the institution and sent a copy of their resolution to the Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department. In 1849 grand juries of both the Central
Criminal Court and the Middlesex sessions announced their opposition to the
system. Such recommendations were not altogether surprising. Many English judges
were in the habit of calling attention to the uselessness of the system in their jury
addressesY
W. C. Humphreys, a prominent English law reformer, stated that it was a po-
tential menace to the country because it assisted rather than suppressed crime. In
a pamphlet entitled, "Inutility of Grand Juries," Humphreys joined the crusade
for their abolition.2 Other members of the English bar followed suit. The committing
magistrate of Old Bailey prison declared that the grand jury was the "first hope"
of the criminal because it afforded "a safe medium for buying off a prosecution and
is often resorted to for that purpose." Writing to the London Times under the
name "Billa Vera," another lawyer claimed that intelligent and respectable jurors
were "ashamed and disgusted" with their functions. He also revealed that the
Corporation of the City of London had appointed a committee to investigate grand
juries and it had uncovered evidence "decidedly hostile to the system."29 Following
this barrage of criticism, Lord J. Jervis, Attorney General of England, introduced a
bill in Parliament to nullify the power of grand juries sitting in the metropolitan
26 New York Constitution of 1846, Article VI, sec 24; FoURTH REPORT OF TiE COmn SSIONERs
ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1949), 37, 128.
27 JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS (1847-1848), CIII, 265; ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS
OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS (1847-1848), LI, 211; (1849), XLIV, 1; HANsARD's DEBATES, 3d Series,
CXXXXV, 1426.
28 W. C. HinipmuEys, Inutility of Grand Juries, reviewed in THE SOLICITOR'S JOURNAL AND RE-
PORTER (London) (April 1857), I, 326.
2" London TIMES, January 9, 1849.
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police districts. Under the Attorney General's proposal, a jury could not indict a
person until he had had a preliminary hearing before a police court magistrate. But
despite support from English jurists and lawyers, the measure failed to pass Parlia-
ment."
Concentrated efforts in England to do away with the institution were not lost
upon leaders in American legal circles. In February, 1850 the United States Monthly
Law Magazine reported the progress of the movement in England, and commented
editorially that it hoped American judges would follow the example of those in
Britain and take an active stand against the institution. The editorial asked American
newspapers "to keep the matter before the public until a similar bill shall be before
our legislative bodies, and passed."'
Opposition to the grand jury moved from the courts and the pages of the law
journals and textbooks to the floors of the state constitutional conventions for the
first time in 1850. In that year conventions met in three states to revise existing
constitutions and in each of them abolition of the grand jury became an important
issue. In Michigan the Committee on the Bill of Rights reported to the convention
at Lansing that it had struck out the provision guaranteeing the right to indictment
by a grand jury in all criminal cases. When delegate Samuel Clark moved to restore
the provision, the line of battle was drawn and a sharp debate ensued. Clark ad-
mitted that abuses may have crept into the system but he contended that these
could easily be corrected. He warned that complete reliance upon public prosecutors
would be "a dangerous innovation." James Sullivan, an attorney, answered Clark
and maintained that no district attorney could possibly be more arbitrary or dan-
gerous than a secret ex parte body which held its sessions "like the inquisition of the
star chamber." He dwelt long on the average juror's complete ignorance of the law
and pointed to the great expense of maintaining such a useless institution. The
convention voted to strike out the grand jury guarantee, but abolitionist forces
pressed for a constitutional provision specifically doing away with it. A majority of
the delegates were unwilling to go to that extent, however, and left the question for
the legislature to decide.'
At Indianapolis the Indiana constitutional convention also became the scene of a
struggle regarding the future of the grand jury. As in the Michigan convention,
delegates were sharply divided. Some hailed it as an essential bulwark of liberty,
while others denounced it as a "remnant of the barbaric past." Anti-jury forces
worked for a constitutional provision doing away with the system, but the best they
could get in the face of determined opposition was a clause authorizing the legislature
"to continue, modify, or abolish" it at any time. Indiana became the first state to
include such a provision in its constitution."
Opponents of the grand inquest were less successful in the Ohio constitutional
convention than they had been in Michigan and Indiana. B. P. Smith, an attorney
30 London TnEs, April 14, 1859; HANSARw's DEBATES, 3d Series, CXXXXV, 1426.
31 UNITED STATES MONTHLY LAW MAGAZN E (February 1850), I, 200.
nREPORT or THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF RE STATE OF MICMGAN" (Lansing, 1850), 27, 54,84-85,202-219.
]'JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF TxE STATE OF INDIANA TO AmEND THE CONSTITUTION (Indian-
apolis, 1851), 28, 60, 116, 964.
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from Wyandot County, proposed substituting the informatiofi for the indictment,
but only a handful of anti-jury men supported him. They pointed to the arbitrary
nature of grand jury powers and pictured them as an unnecessary tax burden, but
all to no avail. A majority of those present favored retaining the institution, and the
revised Ohio Constitution made indictment by a grand jury mandatory in all
criminal prosecutions.34
In Tennessee, where judicial decisions had successfully restricted inquisitorial
powers, the Supreme Court in 1851 reaffirmed its policy. But not all courts saw fit
to restrict grand juries. New York followed the broad rule adhered to in Missouri and
allowed the juries freer rein in their inquiries. In the federal courts, however, they
tended to become more and more an arm of the court. In 1856 as part of an economy
measure, Congress empowered federal judges to discharge jurors when in their
opinion such action would best serve the public interest.'-
In the following year, delegates met at Salem, Oregon to draft a constitution for
statehood. David Logan, a member of the territorial bar, tossed the question of the
grand jury into the lap of the convention with a resolution to replace the institution
with professional prosecutors. Logan reviewed in detail the origin and history of the
grand inquest and argued that conditions which had once made the institution
necessary no longer existed. He urged Oregon to take the lead in getting rid of the
system and predicted that it would be only a matter of time before most other states
followed suit. George H. Williams, Territorial Chief Justice, came to its defense,
emphasizing its peculiar suitability in a frontier area such as Oregon. He admitted
that, like most newly opened areas, Oregon had more than its share of lawlessness.
Many "desperadoes" had come to the territory from the gold fields of California.
In view of such conditions, the Chief Justice favored a secret method of entering
complaints as a means of protecting citizens from possible reprisals. He explained
to the convention that many persons refused to make complaints before justices
because it might cost them their property or even their lives. Former Territorial
Chief Justice Matthew P. Deady also joined the fight to save the grand jury. Logan
accused those judges and lawyers who defended it of holding on to outmoded legal
machinery merely because they were familiar with the system, and placed them in
the same class with those persons who stood against popular election of judges.
Anti-jury forces failed to secure the outright abolition of the grand inquest, but they
did get a constitutional provision empowering the legislature to nullify the system
at any time.3"
White its opponents in America worked through state constitutional conventions,
anti-jury forces in England kept up their pressure to get Parliament to strip inquests
of all power. Attorney General Sir Frederic Thesiger introduced such a bill in 1852,
14 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
1850-1851 (Columbus, 1851), 11, 328-329.
'- Glenn vs the State, 31 Tennessee 19 (1851); The People vs Hyler, 2 PARxER CRIMINAL REPORTS
(New York) 566 (1855); STATUTES AT LARGE OF TE UNITED STATES (1856), XI, 50; THE CONGRES-
SIONAL GLOBE 34 Congress, 1st and 2d session, (1856), 1671-1675, 2161, 2181.
" CHARLES H. CARY (ed.), TE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1857 (Salem, Oregon, 1926), 197, 212-215.
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1854, and again in 1857. Each time he sought to convince his colleagues that the
grand jury was useless in large cities in view of improved methods of police investiga-
tion. Sir Frederic pointed out that many of the jurors themselves look upon their
job as a fruitless one. After the proper judicial urgings, juries in the metropolitan
district of London had presented themselves year after year as "an impediment to
the administration of justice." In spite of all efforts, the Attorney General could not
work up sufficient enthusiasm among members of Parliament to persuade them to
curtail use of the institution.n' However, the question continued to provoke heated
discussion in English legal circles. On December 20, 1858 T. Chambers, a solicitor,
read a paper before the Juridicial Society of London on the future of the grand
jury. He opposed tampering with the institution and expressed a fear that, like many
other modern reforms, the effect would be to "withdraw the people from the tribunals
and replace them by officials." He also warned that justice should not be made to
"rush through professional and official conduits," but should be passed upon by
the people themselves. In the discussion following Chambers' paper, several members
took vigorous exception to his position and insisted that increased efficiency would
follow if "a professional inquiry" replaced the grand jury. The debate did not end
that evening. As late as April, 1859 a letter to the London Times answered Chambers
with the complaint that inquests too often encroached upon the duties of the trial
jury and performed unnecessary work. Although they were unable to secure complete
abolition, English opponents attained some measure of success when Parliament
enacted the Vexatious Indictments Law in July, 1859. Thereafter, private citizens
had to present certain cases to a police magistrate who would then determine whether
the person could go before a grand jury.3"
In the United States anti-jury forces made their first attempt to abolish the system
by legislative action in Michigan in 1859. The state constitution no longer guaranteed
the right to a grand jury indictment, leaving the legislature free to act in the matter.
The judiciary committee of the Michigan Assembly heartily endorsed a plan to end
the use of inquests and issued a scathing report, characterizing the grand jury as "a
crumbling survivor of fallen institutions.., more akin to the star chamber." Led
by Alexander W. Buell, a Detroit attorney, the committee called upon the state to
discard an institution dangerous to individual liberty. They bemoaned the lack of
learning of most jurors and the inability of the courts to control the direction of their
investigations. The committee referred to the "wholesome" curbs which Pennsyl-
vania courts had placed upon grand juries, but they feared that such decisions would
be difficult to enforce and would not prove a satisfactory solution to the problem of
lay interference. The committee's vigorous report proved effective in rallying legisla-
tive support for a bill abolishing the grand jury in Michigan. In February, 1859
the legislature provided that all crimes be prosecuted upon the information of a
37 H~AusA's DEBATES, 3d Series, (1852), CXX, 806; (1852), CXXII, 1115; (1857), CXXXXV,
1425-1426; London TiMxs, July 12, 1854.
39 T. CHAMBERS, On. te Institution of the Grand Jury, JuRmICAr. SOCrETY PAPERS (1858), II,
120, 126-127; SOLICITOR'S JouRNAL AND REPORTER (December 25, 1858), 111, 135; London TIMES,
April 15, 1859; HANsARn's DEBATES, 3d Series, (1859), CLII, 1046.
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district attorney. Only a judge could summon a grand jury for purposes of an in-
vestigation.39
Anti-jury forces in neighboring states watched with interest the success of their
brethren in Michigan. In Wisconsin they drew encouragement and sought to use the
example of Michigan as an opening wedge in a campaign to rid their own state of
the hated institution. The Milwaukee Sentinel published with approval the Michigan
legislative report and attacked grand juries editorially as cumbersome and expensive
"instruments of private malice." Legislative action alone would not be sufficient
to abolish the grand inquest in Wisconsin. The people would have to be educated to
oppose the system, because they would have to approve any constitutional amend-
ment.
40
While its opponents in Wisconsin awaited the next session of the legislature to
propose a constitutional amendment, the fourth constitutional convention for the
Territory of Kansas met at Wyandotte in the summer of 1859. Three previous
constitutions drawn up at Topeka, Lecompton and Leavenworth had each included
a provision guaranteeing the right to indictment by a grand jury in all "capital or
otherwise infamous crimes." The Wyandotte convention adopted the Ohio con-
stitution as its model, but the Committee on the Bill of Rights omitted the article
referring to the grand jury and gave no reason for its action. In a territory deeply
engrossed in the slavery controversy, this blow at popular government went un-
challenged. Five years later it was comparatively easy to put a bill through the
Kansas legislature providing that grand juries were not to be called unless specially
summoned by a judge. 41
When the Wisconsin legislature convened in 1860, Senator Robert Hotchkiss
proposed and the Senate adopted a resolution asking the Judiciary Committee to
investigate the expediency of abolishing the system. Madison and Milwaukee news-
papers hailed this as "a good omen of reform." The Madison Evening Patriot urged
immediate abolition and sounded the rallying cry, "Down with the old rotten fabric."
The Senate Committee reported favorably on a constitutional amendment. When the
resolution reached the floor for debate several senators questioned the power of
states to tamper with the grand jury in view of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution. Only a series of anonymous letters appearing in the Milwaukee
Sentinel came to the defense. The writer, who signed himself "Invariable," predicted
that "gross injustice and oppression on the one hand and bribery on the other"
would inevitably follow if prosecution was left at the mercy of one man. The Wis-
consin Senate passed the resolution calling for a constitutional amendment, but its
action went for nothing when the Assembly buried the resolution in committee.1
39 Report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives on recommending the passage
of the bill to provide for the trial of offenses upon information, Michigan House Document No. 4 (1859);
MICHIGAN HousE JOURNAL (1859), 237; Michigan Senate Journal (1859), 567; LAWS OF MicmGAN
(1859), No. 138, sec. 1, 7.
40 MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, February 1, 12,1859.
41 ARIEL E. DRAPIER, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE KANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
(Wyandot, Kansas, 1859), 68, 288, 676-678; LAWS OF KANSAS (1861), Ch. 64, sec. 1, 7.
42 MADISON (Wisconsin) EVENING PATRIOT, January 17, 1860; MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, February
1, 12, 1859; November 30, 1859; January 19, 30, February 17, 1860; MONROE, WISCONSIN STATES
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In Canada, the Upper Canada Law Journal, representing the sentiments of the
Toronto Bar, took notice of the movement in England and the United States. The
Canadian Journal reprinted English attacks upon the grand jury and went on record
for abolition of an institution "which affords great facilities for gratifying private
malice." This opinion received legislative approval in 1860 when the Canadian
Legislative Council passed a bill to end the use of inquests in the Recorders' Courts of
Upper Canada.4
In July, 1864 foes of the inquest made a concerted effort to end its use in Nevada.
The convention framing a constitution for statehood became the scene of a bitter
dispute, but jury protagonists finally convinced the delegates that a popular tribunal
was better fitted than a public prosecutor to handle the problems of law enforcement
on the frontier. Nevada came into the Union in 1864 under a constitution which
guaranteed the right to indictment by a grand jury.41
In 1864 while Americans were engaged in a cruel Civil War, John N. Pomeroy,
Professor of Law at New York University, applauded the fact that the grand jury
remained in the United States as "an insuperable barrier against official oppression."
Its -Value had become more apparent in the light of arbitrary arrests and military
government of wartime. Pomeroy stated with satisfaction that "the innovating hand
of reform has not as yet touched the long-established proceedings in criminal actions
.. the grand jury (is) carefully preserved by our national and state constitutions. '45
However, the professor's conclusions were more hopeful than realistic. Agitation had
already begun in some states to follow the lead of Michigan and abandon use of the
institution, while in Illinois, Indiana, Oregon and Kansas the legislatures were free of
all constitutional restrictions in the matter. In Pennsylvania and Tennessee judicial
decisions had seriously curtailed the initiative of grand juries. American legal scholars
had long ago joined the crusade, many of them insistent that they had survived
all possible usefulness. Abroad in England and Canada, the two other principal
common law countries, they were under heavy attack.
Part Two
1865-1917
In the decade following the Civil War, efforts to abolish use of the grand jury in
the United States assumed almost epidemic proportions. The rash of post-war con-
ventions to frame and revise state constitutions gave opponents of the institution
an opportunity to be heard. Legal and governmental theorists, speaking in the name
of progress, had long inveighed against the grand jury as a relic of the barbaric past;
too inefficient and time-consuming for an enlightened age. They conceded that
inquests may at one time have been necessary safeguards against royal despotism, 46
RiGHTs, April-20, 1859; WiscoNsIN SENATE JOURNAL (1860), 43,71,277; WIScoNsIN HousE JouRNAL
(1860), 407; Madison, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, January 16, February 15, 17, 18, 1860.
"3 UPPER CANADA LAW J'OURNAL (March 1859), V, 21-52; (December 1860), VI, 274-275; JoUR-
NALs or T=n LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY or CANADA (1860), 77, 82, 415.
44 OFFICIAL REPORT o THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONSTITTIONAL CONVENTION
OF NEVADA 1864 (San Francisco, 1866), 24, 60, 196-198.
45 JOHN N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRnm= L LAW (New York, 1864), 126.
11 ELLIOT ANTHONY, Origins of Grand Juries, CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS (October 17, 1868), I, 20-21.
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but the need for such protection no longer existed in the United States. A few indi-
viduals cautioned that a free government might require even more checks than a
despotism, but progress seemed to be the enemy of the grand inquest and many
states abandoned the system in its name.
In Wisconsin opponents resumed their pre-war campaign to abolish the institution.
They pointed to the speed and ease with which prosecutors accused offenders in
Michigan where the grand inquest was dead. In contrast they pictured Wisconsin
juries as "secret conclaves of criminal accusers, repugnant to the American system."47
Assemblyman A. J. Turner introduced a resolution in January, 1869 to amend the
state constitution to rid the state of grand juries. Although a majority of the Judiciary
Committee favored delay in the matter, a minority group issued a vigorous report
denouncing the system and brushed aside all opposition. In the Senate as in the
Assembly, anti-jury forces painted a black picture of the institution and took ad-
vantage of their superior unity of purpose to gain the support of doubtful senators.
Defenders advised caution but the spirit of advancement and reform swept away
their objections. Governor Lucius Fairchild approved the joint resolution when it
passed both houses of the legislature in 186948 and again in 1870. 49 The question
then became one for the people of Wisconsin to decide. Apathy and indifference
marked the campaign which followed as interest in state and local candidates over-
shadowed the proposed amendment. A few Democratic newspapers conducted
editorial campaigns against abolition of the grand jury, charging that it was a
Republican measure, but they made little headway. The Grant County Herald
announced that a Republican scheme to get control of criminal prosecutions lay
behind the amendment. The Milwaukee News warned that killing the grand jury
was "another step onward in the concentration of power," a process which the recent
war had hastened. It cautioned against destroying a popular institution which might
be necessary to oppose tyranny of the federal government.5 0 In answer to such attacks,
proponents of the amendment assumed the pose of reformers, struggling to rid the
state of "an expensive, unjust system." 51 In the referendum on November 7, 1870
the people of Wisconsin voted overwhelmingly for reform and the grand jury ceased
to exist in the state except when specially summoned by a judge.5 -
While opponents of the grand jury in Wisconsin were struggling to rid their state
4 7 MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, May 3, 1867; January 23, February 17, 1868; WISCONSIN STATE
JoURNAL, January 22, 1868; JANESViLLE (Wisconsin) GAZETTE, February 19, 1868.
4$ WISCONSIN ASSEMBLY JOURNAL (1869), 39, 400-440, 565, 944; WiscoNsIN SENATE JOURNAL
(1869), 526,600; WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, February 19,25, March 5, 1869; MILWAUKEE SENTINEL,
March 1, 1869; GENERAL LAWS OF WISCONSIN (1869), Joint resolution no. 7, p. 270; Letter from E.
Steele to Governor Lucius Fairchild, November 28, 1868, FArRCHILD MSS, Wisconsin State Historical
Society.
49 WiscoNsIN ASSEMBLY JOURNAL (1870), 535; WIscONsIN SENATE JOURNAL (1870), 67; GENERAL
LAWS OF WiscoNsIN (1870), Ch. 118.
50 LANCASTER, Wisconsin GRANT COUNTY HERAILD, October 25, 1870; MILWAUKEE NEWS, October
30, 1870; November 5, 1870; MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, November 17, 1870.
51 WISCONSIn STATE JOURNAL, October 17, 1870; OSHKOSH (Wisconsin) CITY TIMEs, November 2,
1870.
52 MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, January 9, 1871; Wisconsin Constitution of 1V49, Article I, sec. 8, as
anended.
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of the hated institution, their compatriots in Illinois won a partial triumph. They
succeeded in getting the constitutional convention in Springfield in 1870 to give the
legislature the power to abolish the system. Such a procedure avoided any direct
referendum on the matter." Shortly after adoption of the new constitution, a special
legislative committee urged the legislators to exercise their new authority and
eliminate "so thoroughly despotic and subversive" an institution. Petitions approved
the committee's advice, but the legislature failed to act on the proposal.5"
In England the year 1872 saw partial success crown the thirty year struggle to
eliminate the grand jury. Parliament provided that grand juries would no longer
be used in the London metropolitan district except when summoned by a magistrate.5
There followed in the United States a series of constitutional conventions in which
the question of retaining the grand jury system became an important issue. Delegates
assembled at Charleston, West Virginia in 1872 refused to be swayed by talk of
progress and voted down proposals to turn all criminal prosecution over to public
officials.56 Advocates of reform were more successful in the Ohio constitutional con-
vention, where they deleted the guarantee of a grand jury indictment in all criminal
cases. Ohio retained the institution, however, when the people refused to approve
the new constitution. In Missouri, in contrast to most states, grand juries actually
strengthened their authority, with a direct constitutional mandate to investigate all
officials having charge of public funds at least once a year.5 s Anti-jury forces fared
better in the western conventions. The Nebraska constitution of 1857 allowed the
legislature to "abolish, limit, change or amend" the grand jury system. Ten years
later the legislators exercised this power and inquests became extinct in another
state.59 In 1876 Colorado followed the lead of Nebraska and put the matter up to the
legislature which abolished grand juries shortly after.6" The California constitution
of 1879 allowed prosecution of criminal offenses upon the information of a prosecutor,
but it also stipulated that grand juries be called in each county at least once a year.6'
Western areas were more receptive to proposals to streamline their judicial ma-
chinery. In the South, the Radicals made no attempt to eliminate grand juries in the
3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Or ILLINOIS, 1869-1870
(Springfield, 1870), 176, 202, 1569-1573; Illinois Constitution of 1870, Article II, sec. 8.
u Reports of the Special Committee on the Grand Jury System, Reports to the General Assembly of
Illinois (1873), IV; JOURNAL OF E SENATE OF III ors (1873), 300.
65 35 & 36 VICTORIA c. 52 (August 6, 1872).
56 JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA
(Charleston, 1872), 37, 58.
57 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES or E THRD CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF OHIO (Cleveland,
1873-1874), I, 113, 191; II, 1737.
58 DEBATES OF TEM MIssouRI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION or 1875 (Columbia, 1930-1945), I,
264-265; MIssouI CONSTITUTION OF 1875, Article II, sec. 12; Article XIV, sec. 10.
59 FRANCIS N. THORPE (ed.), The Federal and State Constitutions (Washington, 1909); IV, 2362,
Nebraska Constitution of 1875, Article I, sec. 10; LAws OF NEBRASKA (1885), Ch. 108, sec. 1.
60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO (Denver,
1907), 115, 198-200; Colorado Constitution of 1876, Article I, sec. 8, 23; LAWS or COLORADO (1883),
160-161.
61 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the States of California (Sacramento,
1880), 81, 150-151, 308-315; STATUTES OF CALIFORNIA (1881), sec. 9, p. 71.
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constitutions which they drafted. When the Southern Bourbons came to write new
constitutions they did not even consider eliminating an institution which had proved
so useful in the Reconstruction period in opposing an unfriendly central government.
JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS
Paced by the twin slogans of economy and efficiency, enemies of the grand jury
had successfully ended its use in many states and curtailed it in others. However,
the constitutional convention and the legislature were not the only means used to
attack the system. Some judges were able to make serious inroads on grand jury
powers to initiate and conduct investigations independently of the court. In Tennessee
the supreme court reinforced its position that inquests could summon witnesses
only where specifically authorized by a specific law. Pennsylvania courts reaffirmed
the very restrictive rule which limited juries to an investigation of matters known
to one of its members or suggested to them by the judge or the prosecutor. Individual
citizens were not free go go before a grand jury nor could jurors summon witnesses
whom they believed could assist them in their inquiries. Any attempt by a private
individual to circumvent this ruling could be punished as contempt of court.62
In the federal courts, as in most states, grand juries had always been free to
subpoena any and all witnesses upon their own initiative. Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase urged jurors, convening in West Virginia in August, 1868, to call before them
and examine fully government officials or any other persons who possessed informa-
tion useful to them. He warned them, "You must not be satisfied with acting upon
such cases as may be brought before you by the district attorney or by members of
your body."" In view of Chief Justice Chase's statement of the broad rule prevailing
in the federal courts, it was indeed a strange doctrine which Justice Stephen Field
announced in August, 1872. Justice Field was the brother of the well-known legal
reformer and codifier, David Dudley Field, who had tried his best to eliminate use
of the grand jury in New York. Justice Field told a federal jury at San Francisco,
California that it should limit its investigations to such matters as fell within their
personal knowledge or were called to their attention by the court or the prosecuting
attorney. He warned them in particular against delving into political matters unless
instructed to do so. If neither the judge nor the prosecutor placed a matter before
them, Justice Field observed, "it may be safely inferred that public justice will not
suffer if the matter is not considered by you." He reminded the jurors that the type
of government which existed in the United States did not require the existence of a
grand jury as a protection against oppressive action by the government. The re-
strictive charge of justice Field excluded private persons from the grand jury room
and curtailed the freedom of action of jurors. It represented an effort to subordinate
the grand jury to the wishes of the judge and prosecutor. As such, it contradicted
accepted practice in the federal and English courts, as well as a great majority of the
state courts.64
12 Harrison vs State, 44, Tennessee 195 (1867); E. H. STOWE, Charge to the Grand Jury, PITTSBURGH
REPORTS, 111, 174 (1869); McCullough vs Commonwealth, 67 PENNA STATE REPORTS 30.
63 Grand jury charge delivered by Chief justice Chase, 30 FED CAS 980 (1868).
64 Grand jury charge delivered by Justice Field, 30 FED CAS 993 (1872); SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON
and EDWIN G. MERRIAm, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF JURIES,
INCLUDING GRAND JURIES (St. Louis, 1872), 668-672.
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Not all American jurists desired to narrow the scope of grand jury activity, how-
ever. In Silver City, Idaho Territory, Judge H. E. Prickett solicited jurors to investi-
gate all official misconduct and neglect of duty. He told members of the jury that
they possessed full authority to call and examine all governmental officials or any
other person in the community. 65 Federal District Judge Walter Q. Gresham told
jurymen at Indianapolis in 1878 that attempts to protect persons for political reasons
should not prevent them from making a full investigation of a matter, but instead
should inspire them with additional determination to bring the person to justice. 6
Although Field's voice was only one among many, the doctrines which he enunciated
found favor with legal scholars and members of the bar who had long advocated
placing the grand jury more completely under the control of the court. Francis
Wharton, authority on criminal law, who had often advocated such a course, magni-
fied the importance of Field's statements and attached great weight to them. In
spite of the fact that Field stood completely alone in his statement of the "new"
federal rule, Wharton wrote in 1889, "This is the view which may now be considered
as accepted in the United States courts and in most of the several states." As proof
of the latter, he cited Pennsylvania and Tennessee decisions, the only states having
such a rule. In drawing his conclusion, Wharton accepted as the majority viewpoint
a position which coincided closely with his desire to reduce the grand jury to a
position of subservience.Y
In 1881 New York state finally adopted the Code of Criminal Procedure prepared
by David Dudley Field in 1849. However, to the great disappointment of those who
had assisted in its preparation, the legislature dropped the requirement that a
preliminary hearing before a judge was necessary before a grand jury could return
an indictment. Not only did the New York legislators see fit to leave the grand jury
unfettered, but they included a provision requiring all inquests to make particular
inquiry into official corruption and misconduct.6 8
In the West, however, anti-jury forces continued to win victories. In a special
referendum held in Iowa in November, 1884 the people voted to amend the state
constitution to give the legislature authority to abolish grand juries completely.6"
For many years, persons advocating that states abandon the indictment in criminal
proceedings had felt plagued by those who pointed to the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution as standing in the way. Although state and federal courts
had frequently stated that the guarantee of the right to an indictment in the fifth
amendment applied only to the federal government, the matter invariably came up
for debate at constitutional conventions. With the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, there were those who insisted that the phrase "due process of law"
included the right to indictment by a grand jury. As early as 1872 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided that the fourteenth amendment did not prevent states from
ceasing to use the indictment, but the question remained a point of controversy
6- Srr.vE_ CITY AvAL.ACH (Idaho Territory), May 12, 1877.
"In re Miller, 17 Fed Cas 295 (1878).
67 FRANCIS WHARTON, C=MAL PRACTICE AND PLEADING (Philadelphia, 1889), 227-235.
68FouRTH REPOi~r OF THE ConM sSIoNERs ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING (1849), xxxiv; NEW
YORiu CODE OF CRxIBNAL PROCEDURE (1881), Ch. 2, sec. 260-261.




until the United States Supreme Court settled it in 1884. The test case arose in
California when Joseph A. Hurtado challenged his murder conviction on the ground
that he had come to trial on an information rather than a grand jury indictment.
The high court gave the judicial green light to states which desired to get rid of the
grand inquest. Citing the Wisconsin decision with approval, the justices announced
that "due process of law" included any system of prosecution which preserved liberty
and justice and was not limited to indictment by a grand jury. Justice John M.
Harlan's vigorous dissent stated the case for those who believed that indictment by a
jury of his neighbors was the right of every American citizen.70
CRITICISM OF THE G.ND JuRY SYSTEM
Criticism of the grand jury in legal circles continued to grow in the United States
in the 1880's. Seymour D. Thompson and Edwin G. Merriam in their Treatise on the
Organization, Custody and Conduct of Juries came out against the system and stated
that the praise deserved by a few juries had been "quite undeservedly accorded to
the institution itself."7' In 1886 Eugene Stevenson, a New Jersey public prosecutor,
condemned the grand jury as an arbitrary, irresponsible, and dangerous part of
government which long ago should have come "within the range of official responsi-
bility." He much preferred the efficiency and decisiveness of a public prosecutor,
observing, "It is difficult to see why a town meeting of laymen, utterly ignorant
both of law and the rules of evidence should be an appropriate tribunal. The sum-
moning of a new body of jurors at each term insures an unfailing supply of ignorance."
As a parting blow, Stevenson declared that no sane statesman or legislator "would
every dream of creating such a tribunal" if it did not already exist 2
Later in the same year members of the American Bar Association heard David
Dudley Field reiterate the demand for the efficiency of the expert in judicial pro-
ceedings. Field pointed out that the best civilization was the result of division of
labor, where each person became an expert in his own specialty. The jury system,
Field observed, ignored the benefits to be derived from specialization, largely be-
cause of "superstitious veneration."7 3 Demands that an expert replace a tribunal
composed of representative citizens may have had some basis on the ground of
efficiency, but it also reflected a fear of democracy on the part of many who ad-
vocated the change. Most authors hid their distrust of the people behind charges of
"star chamber" and "secret inquisition" leveled at grand juries. Professor Francis
Wharton, however, made little effort to hide his apprehension regarding grand
juries. Wrifing in 1889, he observed that their value shifted with the political tenden-
cies of the age. At a time when excessive authority threatened, "then a grand jury,
irresponsible as it is, and springing from the people, is an important safeguard of
liberty." However, Wharton emphasized that when "public order and the settled
70 Rowan vs State, 30 Wisconsin 129 (1872); Hurtado vs California, L1O U.S. 516 (1884).
71 THo pSON AND MERRIAM, 569.
71 EUGENE STEVENSON, Our Grand Jury System, Tn Cans LAwN MAGAZINE (December 1886),
713-714, 719; EDWARD Q. KEASBEY, THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF NEW JERSEY (New York, 1912),
III, 95.
7
3 TITus M. COON (ed.), SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD (New York, 1890), III, 208-211.
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institutions of the land are in danger from momentary popular excitment, then a
grand jury, irresponsible and secret, partaking without check of the popular impulse,
may through its inquisitorial powers become an engine of great mischief to liberty as
well as to order." 4 But not all legal scholars and jurists saw inquests as a potential
threat to the ruling group in government and society. Justice Samuel F. Miller,
sitting on the United States Supreme Court, challenged the argument *that inquests
were of value only when there was danger of oppression at the hands of a despotic
monarch. He emphasized their importance in protecting citizens from charges
brought by irresponsible and arbitrary prosecutorsY5
ABOLISHING GRAND JuRIES IN WESTERN STATES
The year 1889 witnessed the admission of the six "Omnibus" states into the Union.
Opponents of the grand jury emerged completely victorious from the constitutional
conventions which prepared them for statehood. Idaho, Montana and Washington
abolished the grand inquest completely except for special occasions, while North
Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming left the question up to their legislatures. In
the Idaho convention the expense of the juries, particularly in thinly settled areas,
provided a potent argument in winning delegates to the cause of abolition. Anti-
jury leaders claimed that the average indictment cost the people $600 to $1,000
and they predicted savings amounting to thousands of dollars each year if inquests
ceased to exist. There was no lack of defenders, however, who warned against handling
politicians the power of accusation and stressed the need of a people's body to in-
vestigate local officials. In spite of their efforts, the proponents of efficiency and
economy prevailed in IdahoY Delegates attending the Montana convention at
Helena in the heat of July, 1889 faced the same decision. Rallying around the slogan,
"Let Montana cut the thread that binds us to the barbarous past," advocates of
abolition posed as reformers and attacked the grand inquest as an outmoded and
even dangerous institution. They cited Wisconsin as a model to pattern after. De-
fenders of the jury opposed hasty action as a step in the direction of centralization,
by removing one of the important barriers "which serves to protect the rights of the
citizen against the government." Despite such protests, a majority of the Montana
delegates favored eliminating the grand jury in their state7 It met the same fate
on the floor of the Washington constitutional convention. In the three other new
states, the stories were similar. Promises of economy and lower taxes prevailed against
warnings not to kill a democratic institution. Legislatures in North Dakota, South
Dakota and Wyoming did not hesitate to exercise their prerogative, and grand
juries ceased to exist within their bordersY8
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It became increasingly clear to Americans who wished to curb or eliminate the
grand jury that getting rid of the institution by law or constitutional amendment
offered the best chance of success. In spite of Wharton's efforts, state and federal
courts were reluctant to adopt Stephen Field's new restrictive doctrine. In March,
1891 the Supreme Court of Maryland ruled that grand juries could initiate any type
of prosecution, regardless of how the case came to their attention. To deny it such
powers, the Maryland court insisted, would make juries useless and mere tools of
the court and prosecutor. Justice David Brewer spoke the mind of the United States
Supreme Court when he announced that accepted practice in America allowed
grand juries to investigate any alleged crimes "no matter how or by whom suggested
to them."7 9
AucrAcKs UPoN Tfl GRAND JURY
Concentrating their efforts on eliminating the grand jury entirely, members of
the bar emphasized the danger of lay interference in judicial matters and called for
efficiency in administering justice.8" Speaking before the annual convention of the
Ohio State Bar Association in July, 1892 Justice Henry B. Brown of the United
States Supreme Court proposed eliminating the grand inquest as a means of simplify-
ing criminal procedure. He saw in public prosecutors a far more efficient means of
bringing offenders to trial.8 O'Brien J. Atkinson, Michigan attorney, told members
of the Michigan State Bar Association that he could not conceive of any condition
where a grand jury would be desirable "or where its secret methods would not be
productive of evil." He warned those states which had not followed Michigan's
lead in abolishing the institution, that an accusing body with power to pry into
public and private affairs in a secret manner could become a grave threat to liberty in
America.n
In January, 1896 the Territorial Bar Association of Utah met in convention at
Salt Lake City. Territorial leaders were preparing themselves for another try at
statehood and the forthcoming constitutional convention was uppermost in their
minds. In his presidential address, J. G. Sutherland recommended that grand juries
be eliminated after statehood, to be replaced by special prosecutors. Sutherland
denounced inquests as useless, oppressive, and expensive and proclaimed that social
and political changes in the United States had made them "undesirable as well as
unnecessary." ' The President of the Utah Bar Association got his wish a month
AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF WYOMING (Cheyenne, 1893), 716, 726;
LAWS Or NORTH -DAKOTA (1890), Ch. 71, sec. 1, 9; LAWS or WYoumw (1890), Ch. 59, Sec. 1, 14;
LAWS OF SOUTH DAKOTA (1895), Ch. 64, sec. 1, 9.
19 Blaney vs State, 74 Maryland 153 (1891); Frisbie vs United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1894).
10 Grand Juries, THE LAW TnEs (July 18, 1891), LXXXXI, 205.
81 Address by Justice Brown, PROCEEDINGS OF THE OHIo STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (July 1892),
XIII, 42-43.
H Address of O'Brien J. Atkinson to the Michigan State Bar Association, MICH. L. JoUR. (September
1894), HII, 259, 260, 266.
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later when the Utah constitutional convention adoptedi hs proposal and abolished
all grand juries except when summoned by a judge.M
Opponents of the grand jury in all sections of the United States maintained their
pressure to turn criminal prosecution over to experts. In 1897 C. E. Chiperfield told
members of the State's Attorneys Association of Illinois that the average grand
juror possessed few of the qualifications essential to their duties. Lack of legal train-
ing, he contended, led jurors to "wander through time and eternity in a curious
way," often allowing hard luck stories to influence their deliberations. Chiperfield
called for an end to the institution, and he implored, "In the name of progress which
is inevitable, I invoke.., the abolition of that relic of antiquity, the twin sister of
the inquisition, the grand jury in Illinois. ' ' 85 Charles P. Hogan used the same line
of attack when he took the opportunity of his presidential address to urge members
of the Vermont Bar Association to oppose the grand inquest. Characterizing it as
"a cumbersome and expensive piece of legal machinery," he announced that there
was no reason why it should continue to exist "in this enlightened and progressive
age." Hogan suggested discarding the grand jury as the English had discarded the
ordeal and trial by fire.86
Vigorous and frequently vituperative attacks launched by legal leaders in the
name of progress and reform helped discredit the grand jury in the eyes of the
American people. Constant comparison with the inquisition and the star chamber
aimed to pave the way for abandoning the institution. Reformers had their way in
Oregon where in 1899 the legislature exercised the privilege given it in the state
constitution and substituted the information for the indictment in criminal pro-
ceedingsY The following year citizens of Missouri approved overwhelmingly s
amendments relinquishing grand jury duties to district attorneys. In California,
however, where grand juries in San Francisco had gained a reputation as enemies of
municipal corruption, in November, 1902 the people rejected a proposed constitu-
tional amendment to end use of grand inquests entirely. In November, 1904
residents of Minnesota approved abolishing the system in their state. The referendum
on the constitutional change evoked very little discussion and went almost com-
pletely unnoticed in the excitement of a presidential election year. 0
At a time when public confidence in the grand jury was wavering under the
barrage of abuse and the cries for reform, there were few persons who saw the institu-
tion as a potent instrument of the people. Judge Harman Yerkes of Pennsylvania,
8 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
(Salt Lake City, 1898), 313.
85 C. E. CEnPERFIELD, The Abolition of the Grand Jury, ThE A R. LAwYER (October 1897),
V, 488-490.
88 CARLES P. HOGAN, The Grand Jary System, Reports of the Vermont Bar Association (1898),
V, 85-99.
87 LAws OF OREGoN (1889), sec. 1, 100, p. 99-100.
88 WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AmENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Baltimore, 1910),
322, Amendment to the Missouri Constitution.
89 DODD, 297, AmENDmzNT To TE CALIFRNIA CONSTITUTION.
90 DODD, 320, Amendment to the Minnesota Constitution; MINN. JouR., October 28, 1904.
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however, retained the belief that grand juries could provide a means of extending
democratic control of government. In September, 1901 he told jurors of Bucks
County that bodies such as theirs, representing the people of the community, were
not outmoded or useless. In times of great public peril or in the event of deep-seated
abuses, Judge Yerkes observed, "the divided yet powerful and also combined re-
sponsibility of the secret session of the grand jury... has worked out great problems
of reform and correction." He pointed out that abolition of the grand inquest would
leave the accused citizen completely at the mercy of "an unjust or unwise judge or
district attorney," or subject to contrivances of an unscrupulous prosecutor. Judge
Yerkes dispelled the often repeated idea that because the United States was not
ruled by a tyrannical king, grand juries had ceased to be necessary as guardians of
individual liberty. He explained that tyrants even more irresponsible than the despots
of old sought to dominate local, state and national governments. Giant business
monopolies restless of legal restraints and party bosses who did not hesitate to break
judges and create courts took the place of tyrannical monarchs as a danger to freedom
in the United States. Against such ruthless forces Judge Yerkes saw grand juries as
powerful agencies of the people, challenging business or boss domination of govern-
ment. At a time when many legal scholars advised abandoning the grand inquest
as an archaic relic of the past, the Pennsylvania judge saw what they had failed to
see, that there were enemies of freedom in America which demanded the watchful
eye of the grand jury if the American people were to control their government."
In 1904 a Philadelphia grand jury challenged the sixty year old Pennsylvania
rule that it could not initiate investigations unless the judge or the district attorney
bad given their approval. Members of the jury told Judge William W. Wiltbank
they had evidence that certain constables in Philadelphia were using their official
position to extort money from newly arrived immigrants. To obtain additional
information they asked the judge to summon witnesses in the matter. He not only
upheld the Pennsylvania rule and denied their request, but in doing so stated that
victims of the extortion racket could not even go before the grand jury and tell their
stories unless the court or the prosecutor saw fit to ask for an investigation. 2 Pennsyl-
vania remained in the minority on the question, however, as federal and most state
courts continued to follow the common law rule which endowed grand juries with
broad powers to begin investigations.93
Annual meetings of bar associations in the various states continued to serve as
excellent platforms from which to enlist support against the grand jury system.
In July, 1905 the Committee on Law Reform of the Iowa Bar Association recom-
mended and the association adopted a resolution calling for prosecution upon informa-
tion. Judge M. J. Wade of Iowa City sought to ridicule members who did not fall
into line when he stated tartly, "There are some persons in this world who are wedded
to antiquity, revel in cobwebs, and they simply worship whiskers." Judge Wade
tempted his colleagues, saying, "Let us do away with a few things and maintain the
91 Charge to the Grand Jury of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY REPORTS
(1901), XXIV, 164-165.
9In re alleged Extortion Cases, 13 DISTRICT REPORTS or PENNA 180 (1904).
9People ex rel Livingston vs Wyatt, 186 New York 383 (1906), Hale vs Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905).
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law for the benefit of the lawyers who are to convict guilty men."94 justice Brown of
the United States Supreme Court reiterated his dissatisfaction with the grand jury
system in an address to the American Bar Association in 1905. In January, 1906
George Lawyer, Albany attorney, challenged members of the New York State Bar
Association to rid their state of grand juries. To continue to countenance such an
institution, he warned, was to concede that under a republican form of government
the liberties of the individual were in danger just as they had been under a despotism
of the dark ages. Lawyer denounced the "arbitrary power" which inquests exercised
to inquire into and criticize the acts of public officials. He insisted that under the
American form of government the people "require no shield to protect them from
the state's aggressions."95
Opponents of the grand jury system did not have their way entirely. They suffered
occasional reverses in their effort to drive the institution from the American legal
system. Delegates who met at Gutherie, Oklahoma in 1906 to frame a constitution
for statehood agreed to abolish regular sessions of the grand inquest, but they did
not wish to leave the question of summoning a jury entirely up to the local judges.
The Oklahomans did what no other Americans had ever done. They provided that
the people could call a grand jury when they thought it was necessary. The signatures
of one hundred resident taxpayers in a county were sufficient to launch an investiga-
tion.9" In January, 1908 William S. U'Ren, Charles H. Cary, and other Progressive
leaders advocated a return to the grand jury system in Oregon as a part of their
program to increase popular control of the government. They made use of the
initiative petition to bring the question of a constitutional amendment before the
people of Oregon. The referendum evoked little debate. Opponents of the amendment
accused grand juries of being responsible for long delays in justice, while Progressive
leaders replied with the charge that the information system enabled district at-
torneys to use criminal prosecutions for political purposes. On June 1, 1908 after nine
years without them, residents of Oregon voted two to one to restore the grand jury
in their state.97 In New Mexico as well as in Oregon, the people expressed themselves
in favor of retaining control over criminal prosecutions. At public hearings conducted
by the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the Constitutional Convention in 1910,
popular opinion overwhelmingly favored keeping the grand jury. As a result, New
Mexico became one of the few western states to summon inquests regularly to attend
its courts.98 In Arizona a different story unfolded. Even as a territory it had aban-
doned the grand jury. The Constitutional Convention did not consult the wishes
of the people, but voted to continue the practice of substituting an expert prosecutor
for a body of representative citizens.99
9
PROCEEDINGS OF TE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1905), XI, 58, 141.
95 GEORGE LAWYER, Should the Grand Jury System be Abolishedt REPORT OF TrE NEW Yo x
STATE BAR ASsOcIATIoN (January 1906), XXIX, 29-43.
96 THORPE, VII, 4274, Oklahoma Constitution, Article II, sec. 17.
97 PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 26, 1908; Ci ls H. C AY (ed.), The Oregon Constitution and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention (Salem, Oregon, 1926), 444; ALIEN H. EATON, The Oregon
Systemn (Chicago, 1912), 70, 166.
18 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF NEW MExIco (Albuquerque, 1910),
82-85, 197.
99 MINUTES Or THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA (Phoenix, 1911), Article II, sec.
20; Article VI, sec. 6.
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Gradually, critics of popular participation in judicial proceedings shifted the
basis of their public opposition. They ceased to state boldly that the people should
not interfere in matters for which they had no training. Such statements had an
unpleasant, undemocratic ring and actually might rally support for the hated in-
stitution. Instead they began to stress the waste of time and money which grand
juries entailed. H. N. Atkinson, Houston lawyer, told members of the Texas Bar
Association that "a useless and unnecessary piece of legal machinery" cost Texas
counties between $100,000 and $200,000 each year, in addition to taking men away
from their homes and businesses to do work "which one man can do just as well."' 00
Aaron Hahn of Cleveland repeated this argument in urging the 1912 Ohio Con-
stitutional Convention to eliminate the grand jury from that state.' In England a
Parliamentary Commission composed of judges and legal experts studied the causes
of delay in English courts. In 1913 they reported that the grand jury system "use-
lessly puts the country to considerable expense and numerous persons to great
inconvenience." The Commissioners regarded the grand inquest as "little more
than an historically interesting survival" which had "outlived the circumstances
from which it sprung and developed." They recommended that Parliament take
action to eliminate it from the English court system. Not all British jurists agreed
that grand juries no longer served a useful purpose, however. Judge L. A. Atherly-
Jones of the London City Court warned those who sought reform at the expense of
popular government that "the bold hand of the innovator" should not touch those
institutions which guard personal liberty.' Americans who opposed grand juries
commented approvingly on the English report. The New Jersey Law Journal pre-
dicted that it would be only a question of time before they would cease to exist in
every state in the Union. 03
In June, 1915 William Howard Taft appeared before the Judiciary Committee of
the New York Constitutional Convention aid took the occasion to press home an
attack upon the grand jury system. Drawing upon his experience as a judge, the
ex-President criticized it as a "bulky and costly" institution which served only to
relieve district attorneys of responsibility for prosecutions. He heartily endorsed the
movement to substitute a legal expert for an unwieldy body of laymen. The New
York convention considered several proposed amendments limiting the use of grand
juries but they did not adopt them. 4 However, not all persons familiar with the
work of grand juries believed they were too costly and cumbersome. Edward Lindsey,
of the American Institute of Criminal Law, hailed their broad inquisitorial powers
as an essential part of judicial machinery which was in constant use to secure in-
100 H. N. ATrsoN, The Useless Grand Jury, LAw NOTES (September 1911), XV, 109-110.
01 JOURNL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF OHIo (Columbus, 1912), 55.
10 Second Report of the Royal Commission on Delay in the King's Bench Division, Reports of Com-
missioners to the House of Commons (London, 1914), XXXVII, 22; London Ts, January 6, 8, 10,
1914; Boston EVENING TRANscRIPT, January 17, 1914.
"'3 Editorial Notes, NEw JERSEY LAW JouR. (April 1914), XXXVII, 97-98; Evile of the Grand
Jury System, LAw NOTES (February 1914), XVII, 218.
104 NEw Yopic Tmxs, June 12, 1915; Judge Taft and the New York Constitutional Convention,
VIRGINIA LAW REGISTER (July 1915), I (N.S.), 226; Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention
of New York (Albany, 1915), I, 221-22.
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formation otherwise unobtainable. Lindsey pointed out that prosecutors and police
departments were at best feeble substitutes for the powerful grand inquest." 5
Although Lindsey defended the grand jury against those who would have de-
stroyed it, in doing so he adopted the criteria used by its critics. He sought to justify
the institution on the grounds of efficiency. On this point the grand jury was par-
ticularly vulnerable. Few persons familiar with its operations would have denied
that a prosecuting officer could move more rapidly and with greater singleness of
purpose. It remained for a layman well experienced in the work of the grand jury to
defend it as a valuable and democratic agency of the people. Publisher George Haven
Putnam recognized that inquests could be slow and unwieldly bodies which fre-
quently tried the patience of judges and prosecutors, but he did not believe it was
fair to judge the institution solely on that basis. Democracy did not necessarily mean
efficiency. It meant a careful concern for the rights of persons who had been arrested
as well as the ability of citizens to initiate investigations of abuses in government
and make officials responsible to them. After serving on grand juries in New York
City over a period of thirty-five years, Putnam became convinced that no other
institution provided such a degree of popular participation in government. He
openly challenged the advice of ex-President Taft, announcing, "There is no other
way citizens can bring criticism directly to bear upon public officials." Putnam saw
grand juries as more than mere law enforcement agencies. He recognized that during
their term of office the jurors acted as the representatives of the people of the county
and in that capacity could call before them all public officials, high or low. When
such bodies ceased to sit, the cause of popular government had suffered a severe
blow. In 1915 Putnam and other laymen who were convinced of the necessity of
preserving the institution in America organized the Grand Jury Association of New
York County, made up of persons who had served on grand juries. They sought to
publicize the importance of the grand inquest to democratic government and to
blunt the attack long waged against lay interference in judicial matters. 06
The period from the Civil War to the First World War witnessed many attempts
in the United States to abolish the grand jury. Armed with the persuasive arguments
of efficiency and economy, advocates of reform achieved their most spectacular
successes in western United States.10 7
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